TRIDENT AND THE UNITED KINGDOM NUCLEAR DETERRENT
A DefenceSynergia Review
This paper is largely based on the DefenceSynergia (DS) submission to The BASIC Trident Commission 2013 updated in the light of emerging evidence.
Overarching Statement - Defence of the realm and its people is the first priority of Government, therefore, the UK should remain a nuclear armed power and a submarine launched Trident system is the best option to meet British requirements. Ultimately, after all other arguments have been exhausted, retention of the independent nuclear deterrent offers the UK the assurance that if all alliances fail this country still has the capability, and will, to deter a nuclear armed foe.
THE CASE FOR RETENTION
Currently the USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) and Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea are acknowledged to have nuclear weapons. Iran is actively engaged in acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Whether international agreements with Iran to desist will be honoured in the long term is still highly debatable. Nevertheless, all states have the technical knowledge to build nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented nor can the knowledge of how to make them be expunged. Non-proliferation treaties have not prevented nations outside the ’Big Five’ from acquiring nuclear weapons or of developing methods for short and long range delivery. Reductions in warheads through arms limitation treaties, policed through international verification procedures, have had some success in limiting overall numbers but not in preventing individual nations acquiring nuclear weapons. And it is against this background that the retention and upgrade of the UK Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) and its Trident II D5 payload must be measured.
It is self-evident to DS that the effects of a nuclear weapon exchange are devastatingly horrendous and, therefore, unacceptable to any nation, which is why self evidently they have only been used in anger twice, and then, over 8 decades ago, at a time when there was only a single nuclear armed power? However, once the technology was developed outside the USA the aptly named philosophy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) focused the attention of all nations – whether they possessed nuclear weapons or not. Therefore it can be cogently argued that the reason there has been a Deterrence gap of 80 years since the last and only use of nuclear weapons is because of the very nature of their known effects. (None of which applies to terrorists, whom, if not acting on behalf of an identified nation state, fall outside the scope of this brief).
The UK Nuclear Deterrent & Multi-lateral Disarmament. The UK nuclear deterrent is currently vested in the US ’Trident’ II D5 MIRV system delivered by 4 British built Vanguard class submarines – one of which is on station 365 days a year. These replaced the Polaris system in 1994 which in turn replaced the Royal Air Force (RAF) Blue Steel air delivered system circa 1970 - (WE.177 was withdrawn from RAF service in 1998). UK has a self-imposed limit of 48 warheads for its single at-sea-operational-submarine which is minuscule when measured against the stockpiles of warheads held by Russia, USA with circa 3825 deployed warheads worldwide in 2013 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Therefore, it would be 'gesture politics' for UK to offer up any of its available 225 nuclear warheads in the cause of ‘Strategic Arms Reductions’ until Russia and the USA begin to reach near parity with the UK. Whereas China has more than doubled its nuclear warhead stockpile in the last 2 decades to circa 500-600.
Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament. Unilateral nuclear disarmament will weaken UK defence and is a non-starter as many learned academics, statesmen, servicemen and main stream politicians have continually testified. Currently retention of the nuclear deterrent in one guise or another is official policy of the Labour Party and has cross party support in Parliament. There is little to be gained re-rehearsing the cogent arguments and stated positions here. Suffice it to repeat the last sentence of the opening paragraph – after all other arguments have been exhausted, retention of the independent nuclear deterrent offers the UK the assurance that if all alliances fail this country still has the capability and will to deter a nuclear armed aggressor. The 'unilateralist' lobby, championed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the Green party, Welsh and Scottish Nationalist Parties ignore all this evidence preferring that Great Britain abandon all association with nuclear weapons and, presumably, as the argument is couched in 'moral' terms, those of USA and France. This, even as non-NATO states (Russia, China and India) upgrade and others like North Korea acquire their own nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Most importantly the UK declares its Nuclear Deterrent in defence of NATO.
THE UK NUCLEAR DETERRENT RETAINED - WHAT SYSTEM IS REQUIRED?
Due to its effect, the nature of the nuclear weapon moves it beyond normal procurement parameters and puts the decision making process into the hands of the Political elite. Therefore, once the political decision has been made to retain the deterrent, it is a matter for government, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), to decide upon the most efficient delivery system to meet the declared Strategic objective. (Indeed it is argued by some that the nuclear deterrent is not a military weapon per se, therefore, it being a weapon of last resort, to ensure national survival, it should be funded from central funds - not out of the defence vote.)
Where the type of delivery system is critical to the geopolitical dynamic is in relation to its range and targeting accuracy rather than yield or possession. Without the ability to accurately target world-wide locations the weapon system loses its international deterrence/threat value. Thus, the test firing of longer range rocket systems in exoatmospheric demonstration by North Korea changed this balance in SE Asia. For the UK, located in the upper latitudes of the Northern hemisphere, surrounded by friendly European nations – stand fast a revanchist and threatening Russia - the need for a nuclear weapon delivery system that offers global reach is key. A short range system – tactical or theatre - being of limited deterrent value. However, to the 3 strategic requirements of operational warhead, reach and accuracy, must be added, certainty and credibility, when considering what system offers the UK full utility.
Air Launched System.Currently, none of the Royal Air Force's (RAF) front line combat aircraft have sufficient endurance to fill the strategic requirement, nor (since the demise of WE.177) is there an air launched nuclear weapon in the UK’s inventory. For a modern air-launched nuclear system to meet the certainty and credibility criteria, it must be available 24/7, have built-in survivability and, be able to hit distant targets with accuracy and certainty. For these reasons and the known geographical position of launch airfield, it is difficult to conceive of a credible RAF answer to this complex set of parameters. As a comparison consider the United States Air Force B2 Spirit strategic bomber. This programme cost circa $46bn and each of the 20 aircraft over $750m at 1990s prices and this is before any weapons development costs are factored in.
Land Launched System Land based silos in the UK were discounted decades ago as expensive and problematic to construct and no current weapon exists. Public opposition to sites near to their homes (the NIMBY effect) would present considerable and possibly insurmountable planning and security issues, and, more importantly, these sites present a fixed target location for an enemy pre-emptive strike. Basing on an overseas territory would be internationally unacceptable and arguably a Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) violation, as would any move by HMG to generate a completely new nuclear delivery system. This leaves the extant sea launch option as the front runner.
Sea Launched System The ocean surface is considerably larger than the land area. The peaks and valleys of the oceans are as diverse as their ‘land’ equivalents and the depths involved offer a 3D puzzle. The tides, currents, temperature and salinity are forever changing making operations in and under water extremely difficult to manage and predict. Detection, identification and communication is difficult to achieve despite the advances of technology and conducting surveillance underwater, installing reporting systems and effectively monitoring the areas required is unlikely to be possible for many years. Indeed the hunt for a Malaysian aircraft lost in the Indian Ocean in 2014 has still not been resolved despite many attempts.
Surface Option. Surface and/or submarine launched missile systems would seem to offer an obvious proven alternative. However, the manifest disadvantages for any surface ship option - even allowing for extensive development costs - is lack of stealth and the inability of surface vessels to travel any distance undetected or unsupported. Therefore, as surface vessels are easy to track they are also extremely vulnerable and could not provide the essential certainty and credibility that deterrence requires.
Cruise Missiles. The primary constraints with current cruise missile technology are that it is a sub-sonic low level. This makes the Tomahawk vulnerable to most enemy air-defence systems. With a range of only circa 1550 miles - compared with a Trident II D5 range in excess of 6500 miles - this severely restricts the Tomahawk submarines operational firing area and may increase the number of boats required to meet global reach for Continual at Sea Deterrence (CASD) operations.
Submarine Launched Trident System. The Trident launched SSBN option is the best option given that it is a proven technology that meets all the criteria and for which protocols, training, operational expertise and support are already in-place. The SSBN has proven stealth characteristics which enable it to transit to and from a firing zone without detection and to remain on station, unsupported, far longer than any surface vessel or aircraft. Its Trident II D5 missiles have yields of between 10 and 100 kilo-tons and can accurately hit targets worldwide. Since Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 was published, 8 missiles and up to 40 independently targeted warheads are authorised by HMG. However, this weapon load is still more than capable of inflicting assured unacceptable damage upon a potential adversary that deterrence is assured.
Independence of Action. Former senior RN personnel have confirmed that Trident is independent, as far back as the British Prime Minister (PM). In a BBC interview, Gordon Brown, the former British Labour PM, stated that “Trident is indeed an independent system”, emphasising that release of weapons does not require access to satellites, codes, or the permission of any country, including the United States. However, some critics still argue that the system is technically dependent on the US for provision of missiles, servicing and the common missile compartment (CMC) for 'Dreadnought' and that this, de-facto, renders it a quasi-client system and not truly independent. This position was unconvincing, not least because the USA has been supportive of UK CASD since the 1962 Nassau Conference established US support for Polaris provided the UK system was also allocated to NATO. Which it is to this day. Although current US/NATO relations are influx the pre-EU traeties and agreements that UK has with the USA, such as Trident and Intelligence sharing will continue. It can be cogently argued that British and French independent nuclear deterrence is actively supported by the USA because this independent nuclear capability adds decision making uncertainty in the minds of potential nuclear armed aggressors, like Putin. Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that US support for UK Trident was curtailed, the effects would be well down-stream with no immediate affect to operational capability - the submarine and in-use missiles and warheads still being fully functional.
CASD Is A System. Deterrence is an integrated system, not simply a missile and warhead and requires many component parts to function effectively, from people to hardware. Therefore, for the system to be continuous, credible and truly independent an indigenous Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability is required. The Hunter Killer SSN, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Frigate, Mine Counter Measure (MCM) craft, helicopters and Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) being integral components of this system - the lack of any one reducing its effectiveness. Relying upon allies to provide LRMPA for our deterrent weakens its independent status and it is encouraging that this capability gap is partially filed by purchase of the Boeing P-8 Poseidon, albeit 9 aircraft is far too few.
Fleet Numbers. First Sea Lords, including Admiral Lord West, are on record supported by many military analysts as preferring a 4 boat fleet to ensure maximum cover. The expert advice is that a 3 boat fleet cannot guarantee 365 day cover because it is vulnerable to accident or technical failure generating unforeseen downtime and an unacceptable gap in deterrent availability. Recent experience also confirms that when boats are delayed for maintenance reasons the operational sortie times are extended for the already overworked crews. Savings on a single SSBN new-build are minimal over the 40 year life of the programme – in the order of £200m pa - with no effect on the cost of deployable missiles and warheads which still have to be funded.
Emerging Aunt Sally's. In recent months the vulnerability of SSBN's to detection and/or operational disruption from Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Cyber threats have been cited as reasons undermining UK nuclear deterrence credibility. However, whilst Cyber warfare is a very real threat to systems that are linked through the global internet, US and UK nuclear submarines are not affected as they operate without such data-linked connectivity. The allegations of vulnerability surrounding UUV technology are based on emerging theoretical developments with current technology which is slow (6kts average) and range limited because of the requirement to run on battery power; the latter requiring the UUV to surface to run generators or use solar energy. it is not the ASW vehicle that is the issue but the sensor equipment it carries. The officially stated position of the Royal Navy is that in 47 years of CASD a UK SSBN has never been located on its patrol station despite extensive research and development and considerable sums of money being expended by Russia on ASW hunter killer submarines, satellites, long range maritime patrol aircraft and surface vessels.
New-Build SSBN Cost. In the mid 2020s Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Fallon, told parliament that MOD had now revised the costings for the 'Successor' programme - 4 boats will cost at least £31bn – £7.5bn per boat - with another £10bn being earmarked for contingency purposes.
Finally, some commentators estimate the total life costs of a replacement Trident system to be £100bn plus and worry about the offset cost for social causes. This figure roughly accords with the new estimates which indicate a procurement cost of circa £31bn and through life running costs of circa £60bn based on £1.5bn per year over 40 years - a total of circa £91bn or £101bn if the contingency fund is used. That equates to circa 94% on conventional and 6% on nuclear defence over the same period. An independent nuclear deterrent based on a 'Dreadnought Successor' SSBN delivered Trident CASD system, will provide the UK with 40 years of security against nuclear attack or blackmail and can be viewed as a public good, a social service in its own right, well worth the cost.
