THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY IN CRISIS
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary [RFA] celebrated its centenary in 2005. This short paper examines the situation that this vital logistics support organisation finds itself facing in 2024 as a result of government failures to recognise its importance over several decades.
To understand the importance of the RFA to the Royal Navy (RN) it is crucial to examine the reasons for the existence of this essential maritime service.
During the 19th century, technical developments led to the replacement of sailing ships with steam engines using screw propulsion and the Admiralty had to establish a world-wide chain of coaling stations. To help achieve this the Admiralty employed non-commissioned, civilian manned ships as fleet auxiliaries which fell into two categories;
a)Vessels taken up by charter [the forerunner of today’s Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT)].
b)Vessels owned and operated by the Admiralty.
There existed a clear division between commissioned warships, and non-commissioned ships, however, it was decided that there should be a clear differentiation between STUFT ships and those owned by the Admiralty. Therefore, I an Admiralty circular letter dated 3rd August 1905 it was stated that the style “Royal Fleet Auxiliary” would identify Admiralty owned ships from those on charter. Thus, was born the RFA.
To satisfy the then Merchant Shipping Act [1894], these RFA ships were registered under the name of the managing owner- the Secretary to the Board of the Admiralty. The Admiralty becoming the owners of what was essentially a shipping line. And little changed until the latter part of the 20th century.
Operation Corporate in 1982 was the catalyst for a significant change of status for the RFA. The advent of auxiliaries fitted with defensive weapons, extensive aviation facilities and embarked naval parties generated official concern about the role of the RFA in support of the UK’s armed forces. This led in April 1985 to HMG suggesting that it intended to de-register all RFA vessels, and as such, the Merchant Shipping Acts would no longer apply. However, HMG also stated that this would not affect the terms and conditions of British merchant seafarers who manned the RFA.
However, after consideration this change and de-registration did not happen. Rather a change of status was initiated, with regulatory responsibilities moving from the Department of Transport to the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
In 1989 this change was formalised in the Merchant Shipping [Ministry of Defence] Order-in-Council 1989. A “letter of understanding ”between MoD [Navy] and the Department of Transport stated that the RFA would continue to comply with 'most' of the relevant Merchant Shipping Acts to 1988 and remain British registered merchant ships.
As it remains to this day! Thus making a nonsense of statements by ministers, MPs and Unions, that the new Fleet Solid Support Ships(FSS) to be built for the RFA are “warships”. They are not, as has been the case since 1905 to date.
CURRENT SITUATION
Discontent with pay and conditions has been building over a period of circa 15 years, with personnel feeling over worked, under valued and with paywell out of alignment with that of the commercial world. Informed sources suggest RFA pay has lost between 25 and 30% of its value over the last 10 to 15 years. The total workforce now stands at around 1,700 people which is not enough to crew the current fleet - it is estimated that the three new FSS ships will require crews of circa100, so it is not difficult to see where this situation is leading.
The wage bill for the RFA [2022/23] stands at £92m and to bring it back to its value in 2010, an increase of around 30% would be required.RFA Masters’ salaries range from £83,541.00 to £95,442.00 per annum. By comparison, Masters and Chief Engineers in the US Military Sealift Command can earn up to $226,300.00 [£175,188.60] per annum. It is not being suggested that RFA salaries should mirror those of their American counterparts, but it illustrates how far behind RFA pay has fallen.
Seafarers with British certificates of competence are much in demand and research suggests qualified UK masters, can command salaries of between £112,000 and £150,000. It is, therefore, arguable that a complete overhaul of RFA terms and conditions is needed now. Which is not a new phenomenon. In 1947/48, pay and conditions lagged behind commercial companies, resulting in a three-figure total of mid-level officers [2ndmates and 3rdengineers in particular] leaving the RFA. The Admiralty, as a responsible ship owner recognised this, and the Director of Stores was quick to recognise and rectify the matter. Perhaps the MoD of today might recognise some of the benefits that accrued from the Admiralty being a ship owner.
CURRENTFLEET
6 TWIN HULLED FLEET TANKERS
Comprising 4 TIDE class [2017-2019]
2 WAVE class [2002]
1 AOR [Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment]
FortClass [doubles as the only Ammunition, Food, Explosives and Stores(AFES) in the fleet] [1992]
3 LANDING SHIP DOCK [AUXILIARY]
3 BAY class [2006-2007]
1 PRIMARY CASUALTY RECEIVING SHIP/AIR TRAINING SHIP
RFA ARGUS [1981]
1 OCEAN SURVEILLANCE VESSEL
RFA PROTEUS [2019]
1 AUTONOMOUS MINE WARFARE SUPPORT VESSEL
RFA STIRLINGCASTLE [2011]
OPERATIONAL STATUS
Of the seven replenishment at sea {RAS] ships in the fleet [the six tankers and the AOR], only two tankers of the Tide class are available. One other [RFA Tideforce] is in refit and the other three, including the five-year-old Tiderace, are laid up at extended readiness. The only solid support vessel, essential for carrier operations, RFA Fort Victoria is laid up with a small maintenance crew. She is supposed to accompany the Carrier Strike Group (CSG)deployment next year, but informed sources suggest she is unlikely to go to sea again because of the inability to crew her, and a defect rectification refit has yet to commence. As an example of the effect of the above, Flag Officer Sea Training [FOST] has had to make an arrangement with the Germans to supply the FOST tanker, as the RFA cannot guarantee to supply a ship for this vital task.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, here is a reminder of the Falklands conflict of 1982[Operation Corporate]. Recently a senior officer was asked if the UK could put together a Task Force if required to repossess the Islands.He replied “of course”.
In 1982 the RFA fleet numbered 27 vessels, of which 22 were committed to the Task Force. These included 10 replenishment tankers, 4 AFES[Ammunition, Food, Explosives and Stores] and one Solid Stores ship.In support were 15 commercial tankers and 12 container ships and freighters [STUFT]. In addition, the liners Queen Elizabeth 2 and Canberra were utilised as fast troop carriers, and among the specialised commercial ships were two specialised off-shore vessels.One of these repaired, at sea, over fifty battle and weather damaged ships. I leave it to readers to decide whether they believe that the assets to form a task group actually exist, or whether it is simply hubris.
DAVID C GRAHAM.
22 JULY 2024
