DefenceSynergia 2024 – What is United Kingdom Defence Strategy?
Summary
DefenceSynergia (DS) has spent the latter half of 2023 re-evaluating the UK's Strategic Defence Position. In doing so, we have considered the following existential threats and the relevance of the conclusions HMG/MOD has made in the 2023 Integrated Review (Refresh) in the light of extant and subsequent international events as follows:
Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stance over its arbitrary 'Nine Dash Line' –rejected by the UN.
Iranian belligerence against Western and Israeli interests in ME.
North Korean belligerence towards South Korea, Japan and USA.
Israel v Hamas conflict; threats and operations in Darfur, Yemen, Kosovo.
Dominating DS thoughts on these threats are HMG's 3 prime Foreign Policy Defence lynchpins: UK's commitment to NATO; an active shift to the Southern hemisphere through AUKUS; and the continuation of high grade intelligence sharing via Five Eyes. All this in addition to the UK's long standing defence commitments and agreements with the UN, Commonwealth and other multi/bilateral agreements such as FPDA with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. These indicate that HMG is prepared in principle to provide military and naval resources in aid of allies on more than two fronts. DS cannot discern a cohesive and articulated UK Strategy for the involvement of HM Forces albeit that the MOD/FCDO may hold detailed plans that are not available to the general public! Given their potential scope, it is difficult to see how the UK’s security and defence forces would be able to cope and manage in any but the most minor incursion.
Whilst circa £3.9bn has been allocated by MOD to BAE Systems for AUKUS SSN development, the ORBAT for HM Forces more generally has not been enhanced to cope with the extra tasking that a pivot to South East Asia/Pacific entails. HMG needs to articulate its Strategic intent – to provide the Chiefs of Staff with clear and unambiguous instructions as to how many fronts HM Forces are to fight on, whether these fronts will be contested simultaneously and over what time frame. With this data at their disposal the Chiefs can calculate and recommend a realistic ORBAT that includes calculated assumptions of rates of effort and weapons expenditure in various scenarios.
That is clear to DS and most honest defence analysts – including UK's allies and enemies - is that HM Forces have been on a steadily declining trajectory since the first of many 'peace dividends' was taken in the early 1990s, not least of which are personnel and weapons platform reductions across all 3 defence domains. It is simply not credible to argue that technology alone can overcome lack of mass – one aircraft, tank, ship or person can only be in one place at a time not least when their declared responsibilities stretch worldwide! To make matters worse, HM Forces are so undermanned that shocks to recruiting targets which in the past could be coped with over yearly cycles are now so critical that the pain is felt almost immediately.
Judging by an almost total lack of visibility of security and defence matters in recent budget statements, it seems clear that these matters are no longer the first priority of government. It is high time for a far more realistic analysis of the strategic aims for the nation’s defence and the necessary requirements that stem from such strategy. The fact that a large proportion of our responsibilities are with allies must be taken into account but, our participation with them must be robust, proportionate and capable of fulfilling the responsibilities which lie directly to ourselves and not hyped-up via over optimistic and often inaccurate media assurances of capabilities in the land,
Sea, Air, Cyber and Space domains.
Finally, DS is aware that with an election sometime in 2024, political parties are positioning themselves and it would be useful to know what each party manifesto has to say about defence priorities. Not least where they stand on NATO membership and participation in the EU CSDP? It is the DS position that the two are not compatible
especially in relation to duplication of or competition with UK defence resources and Command and Control.
