APPLICATION OF MARITIME POWER – AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Military: From the Sea: Power Projection - Strategic and Sub-Strategic Deterrence - Coercion - Combat Operations Against the Land - Combat Operations in Defence of Land Forces – Evacuation Operations - Conflict Prevention - Support to Peacemaking and Enforcement - Poise or Presence in a troubled area offers diplomatic options .
At Sea: Operations against Enemy Forces - Protection of Maritime Trade.
Constabulary & Benign: Embargo, Sanctions & Quarantine Enforcement - Peacekeeping - Enforcement of Maritime Agreements - Disaster Relief - Assistance to Refugees - Peace Building Operations - Search and Rescue - Military Assistance to Foreign and Commonwealth Governments.
THE STRATEGIC CASE FOR CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Since the end of the cold war the Royal Navy (RN) has been unable to fully exercise its role as a strategic asset. However, the future Queen Elizabeth (QE) Class of ircraft carrier could complete all of the applications of maritime power identified above provided appropriate strategic capability - air-group, defensive screen and reconnaissance airborne early warning (AEW) capability – are made available.
The fact that successive governments have taken a risk by letting some roles slip due to budget pressure is not an argument for the status quo. Indeed, it is arguable that some contingencies - such as the Falklands and Libya - may only have succeeded through HM Forces professionalism - despite government policy. But it is a dangerous gamble to rely upon 'can do' to fill capability gaps, not least because of the draw-down in numbers of personnel and assets in recent years leading to lack of flexibility and robustness against losses. The current carrier air-power debate goes
to the heart of this strategic capability gap dilemma.
This begs the question: Defence is said to be the first priority of government. Is it?
Is there evidence to support the oft quoted phrase?
Further In this brief you will find a condensed appraisal of current and future aircraft types for performance data comparison. Having read the data you may agree with DS that they demonstrate that only one airframe
in the F35 family fully meets both the RN and RAF Operational Requirement (OR) for carrier strike and Tornado replacement: F35C.’ [Albeit that leasing or buying the F18/f as an interim solution could provide MOD with a stop gap measure to afford entry of two carriers fitted with cat and traps until a more likely carrier variant and Tornado replacement - such as the F35C – has cleared development and entered service.]
However, the decision by HMG to revert to the Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant prevents the RAF from fully achieving its OR and severely restricts the development of the carriers to be 'future proofed' whilst undermining
survivability by restricting RN Air Defence (AD), Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) capability. The F35B and rotary wing being second best because they will offer far less endurance, range, ceiling height and coverage than other fixed wing types such as the Grumman E2-DHawkeye and F35C/F18 whilst indigenous RN AAR or rapid air-freight resupply have not so far figured in any objective discussion.
When UK's defence focus was on the North Atlantic with NATO, the RAF was able to provide the RN with extensive air power support. However, this failed spectacularly during the Falkland's war, where there were no land bases available in-range or made available with the political support of nations adjacent to Argentina. The RAF could no longer deploy AEW or additional combat support, which left the RN exposed – losing 6 ships as a direct result.
Therefore, this STOVL decision has reintroduced an old air-power argument – that the RAF will be able to support maritime carrier operations with land-based aircraft from friendly bases along the Littoral. And this is where the ‘systems’ argument becomes strategically critical and the arguments in support of STOVL begin to unravel, not least because the difficulties associated with Basing, Overflight and Access (BOA) for land-based air-power have never been fully addressed. Even if the BOA difficulties are somehow overcome and overseas basing of RAF aircraft was not
an issue their range and numbers certainly are. You may wish to ask MOD UK (Air) how the RAF would provide Long
Range Maritime Patrol (LRMPA) for the fleet without any LRMPA in the inventory; how they will provide fast jet Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and strategic AEW wide area surveillance over the fleet area, over 1000 miles
from any shore base, when the total AAR fleet will be based around a maximum of 14 A330-200 tankers?
To complicate matters, the MOD’s two fast jet fleet policy, coupled to the F35B decision affects the RAF, too. Few really believe that the original RAF operational requirement for a medium range 5th generation stealth fighter to replace the
Tornado (750 nm combat range) is met by the F35B (470 nm combat range)? Even CDS and Lord Stirrup think that the F35C is the better aircraft - as do most impartial air-power analysts (note the recent report by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory) - albeit that the former CDS hedged by suggesting that the F35B still largely meets the OR.
You might ask. Which OR – the RAF's, the RN's, both or neither?
The best that can be said for the decision to opt for STOVL is that it simplifies the MOD’s procurement headache (line of least resistance) and may appear to save money in the short term, it might even convince HMG to commission two carriers in SDSR 2015 (we must wait and see) and it may facilitate and simplify RAF operational ooperation with the FAA; but none of these alleged advantages change the fact that the decision to buy STOVL was not, is not, and never will be, the correct one for the long term strategic interests of UK or its armed forces. Indeed recent
developments strongly suggest that the F-35B will mainly be limited to 'Rolling' landings, not 'Vertical', to reduce stress on its engine and airframe – that is, it will most likely be a STORL: Short Take Off and Rolling Landing.
So from a Strategic and operational point of view you may agree that the decision to buy F35B is flawed on these counts:
1. It fails to meet the UK National Security Strategy that calls for a Strike Carrier capability to enforce UK’s worldwide role in air/sea battle terms (just the amphibious support role being practicable).
2. It fails to offer the carrier commander maximum survivability through effective long range Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance C2ISR) and air defence cover.
3. It fails to fulfil the RAF’s OR for a medium range 5th generation stealth fighter to replace the Tornado.
4. It fails to cater for future carrier developments such as unmanned air vehicles or the possibility that STOVL will not enter service or last the full 50 years that these carriers are designed for.
