What Needs to Happen with the Royal Air Force in 2025

Introduction- The Air Staff require to know upon what Strategic Plan the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) is being advised to base his current and future air power ORBAT?

DefenceSynergia(DS) assumes that His Majesty's Government (HMG) is increasingly wedded to a combined NATO/East of Suez (World Wide Role) and basing its foreign policy and resources upon these aims. Therefore it is imperative that the RAF's role in this policy is stated. Not least, to include the RAF's commitment to Royal Navy Strike Carrier Operations in addition to Air Defence (AD) and Offensive Support for UK and NATO forces in Ground Attack (GA), Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), Close Air Support (CAS), Anti-submarine andAnti-surface Ship Warfare and Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) enabled and dependent roles.

The glaring gap in the UK's air defences, is the lack of an IntegratedLayered anti-missile Screen.

Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) will clearly understand the scope of RAF's Ground Support Environment and its tasking. This must surely cover broad in-depth sustainment, ground-based defence environment assets, integrated air (including Sector Operations Centres and supporting infrastructure) missile defences, airfield and aircraft ground defence measures, RAF Regiment and RAF support personnel numbers, reserves and auxiliaries and war casualty handling and replacement.

For the RAF Order of Battle (ORBAT) a Strategic plan would define for the Air Staff how many aircraft and unmanned systems and squadrons are required for credible conventional defences at home, in NATO and for the protection of UK OTs worldwide.

Main Discussion - Fast Jet and Offensive ISTAR enabled support Currently the plan is for circa 9 Predator, 100 Typhoon and 48 F-35B. The final F35B buy figure has yet to be declared. There are some 50 additionalTyphoons that might be upgraded to modern specification but there appears to be no obvious published intention to do so.

It is critical for CAS and First Sea Lord (1SL) to agree on how many F-35B squadrons there will be and what their primary role is. All the Service Chiefs will need to lead the discussion on the moral implications of moving to semi and fully autonomous AI driven systems.

RAF AEW - Surveillance must be continuous to command air and sea space. This is an enduring principle. The original fleet was 7 Boeing E-3D SentryAirborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, which entered service in 1991. The remnants - still the youngest of their type flying - were sold to Peru in 2022 as obsolete. Three E-7 Wedgetail are pledged to fill the gap but this is woefully inadequate; indeed CAS has intimated that 3 E-7 Wedgetail is not enough (DSwhole heartedly agrees). The question is one of surveillance 'barriers' - how many, over what time frame and in what geo-locations will the Strategy concurrently require cover for; all limited by serviceability and on-task endurance. Three aircraft will not be able to maintain even one continuous barrier within UK airspace, not least because airframes become unserviceable and over time need deep servicing taking months to complete, and that E-7s can only be air refuelled by USAF tankers. It was a tenet of Air Defence operations that fighters would deploy with AEW, not as a nicety but because it made an operation orders of magnitude more effective. UK has lost deployable capability.

RN AEW - It is not obvious to DS how the RAF can support RN carrier operation seven when the 3 Wedgetails are in service; the numbers do not add up. This must be a priority issue because RN’s indigenous AEW, Merlin with the 'Crowsnest System', is limited to 10,000 feet operations and a 120nm radar horizon compared to Wedgetail at 35,000 feet and 250nm. Had the UK carriers been fitted with CATOBAR they could have operated E-2D Hawkeye with similar operational cover to that of Wedgetail.

Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) The Air Staff might like to offer an evaluation of RAF LRMPA in conjunction with the Naval Staff re CASD tasking and whether MaritimeAir capability is required beyond UK/NATO region under our expressed intent to be a global power not least with a growing commitment to and working with AUKUS - as stated in the Integrated Review (Refresh).

CAS seems sanguine about this capability being vested in a mere 9 x P-8 Poseidon airframes.

DS strongly disagrees: the RAF had some 42 Nimrods initially declining with age and serviceability problems to 24 as the contract for Nimrod MRA4 was signed. DS view is that a minimum of 18, for a thin service (North Atlantic), and more probably nearer 30 for full capability is required for a 'World Wide Role'.

AAR and AT - RAF AAR and AT is another capability that lacks clear Strategic guidance.

AT - The C130J Hercules has been retired leaving 8 x C17 and 22 x A400M to undertake all tactical AT support. Whether this figure makes sense will depend on the concurrency of tasking should the RAF AT force be required to undertake multiple operations in geographically dispersed locations over the same time frame. For example, if all 8 RAF C-17 were allocated to 16AAB for an operation they could airdrop a total of 800 parachutists with light support in a single pass at a range of circa 2400 nautical miles. With further support provided by A400M Atlas. At 30 tonne payload half the available A400M fleet would offer circa 300 tonnes of ammunition and sustainment support.

AAR - The Air Tanker PFI contract provide A330-200 Voyager on a 27-year contract to provide fourteen aircraft: "core" fleet of nine aircraft – eight with military serials and one civilian registration – and a "surge" fleet of five civil registered aircraft which are used for additional revenue. However, the RAF's Voyagers are only capable of probe-and-drogue refuelling, they are unable to refuel current or future RAF aircraft that are fitted solely for flying the USAF-standard boom refuelling, including the RC-135 Rivet Joint, C-17 Globemaster, P-8 Poseidon and P-7 AEW Wedgetail.

Finally, for AAR, DS is concerned by the lack of RAF aircraft fitted for probe and drogue rather than the increasingly prevalent USAF boom, which limits what we can do with even the low numbers we have. Therefore the RAF is limited on deployments to where USAF has capacity to assist. The RAF might claim this is proof of integrated ops; DS would counter, it's proof of lack of money leading to reliance upon US magnanimity. In April 2016, the RAF stated its interest in retro-fitting a boom to some Voyagers to add operational flexibility to the Air Tanker contract by allowing operation with those RAF and Allied aircraft not fitted for probe and drogue AAR; which DS believes can not happen too soon.

Airseeker - Three RAF RC-135 Rivet Joint Airseeker have replaced 3 Nimrod R1 which were deployed during and post the cold war - probably the correct establishment.

Aero Medical Evacuation (AE) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) There is a considerable need for air evacuation of casualties albeit repatriation can be largely but not entirely done by tasking civilian aircraft taken up from trade. AE is a function largely carried out by an RAF Cadre with RAF Auxiliary units drawn from the NHS and private medical sectors. Since the demise of RAF SAR it is unclear where responsibility and expertise lies for CSAR another essential element of combat air warfare.

UK Air Power Ground Environment and ILAMS - The missing element in UK Air Defence is ILAMS! The lesson of the Ukraine conflict is clear and the RAF must review, develop and revamp its Cold War era integrated and layered anti-Missile defences, not least in the area of Hypersonic Missile technology counters.

To correct this major anomaly MOD (Air) must instigate an Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) for UK wide ILAMS to protect critical bases and infrastructure, storage sites, essential manufacturing and civil government. It is not acceptable to rely upon 6 Type 45 DD equipped with Sampson Radar and Aster Missile systems.

More prosaically the UK air power ground environment, the RAF's operational, maintenance and logistical ground support and resources, require serious attention too. Weapons and spares support beyond 'Just in Time' must be reintroduced albeit the RAF's ability to rapidly deploy to barehub and spoke bases forward of UK is provided through the excellent Expeditionary Air Wing concept.

Finally, RAF Logistics and Maintenance requires revamping to ensure trained combat-ready personnel can deploy forward with air power projection as well as maintain and operate the home base support. War reserves and earmarks need to be calculated based on realistic rates of effort and the funding found to provision and transport large levels of weapons through Air and Sea Port hubs with sufficient Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) clearance.

Conclusions

• An overarching UK National Strategy must be articulated to permit the Air Staff to correctly assess RAF ORBAT and Personnel Establishment to allow an honest appraisal of all Air Fleets and WeaponsStockpiles, Spares Policy and Personnel Establishment. An essential element being the future mix of manned and unmanned air systems.

• There is an urgent requirement for CAS, in consultation with the First SeaLord and CGS, to determine future RAF air support for maritime and ground operations – EG SEAD, Close air support, ASW, AsuW, AAR, AE, CSAR and doctrine and political agreement for unmanned systems.

• Procurement must allow for future proofing of complex weapon systems and funded war reserve and spares-based provisioning system.

• A UOR must be raised for a UK Integrated Layered Anti-missile System (UKILAMS) that can detect, track and combat sub-sonic, supersonic and Hypersonic missiles, funded and developed with utmost expediency.

• This paper sets out the major work required for the RAF to operate effectively; working with other protection services will ensure maximum effect for the nation.

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