Below and on the following pages are excerpts from a DS MP Brief.
FOREWORD
Brief for MPs to DefenceSynergia for a Meeting in Westminster Hall at 17.15 18th June
We are representatives of DefenceSynergia (DS), a small group determined to try and identify the incumbent government’s strategy and deduce from that national defence and security operational requirements. We emphasise that we do not limit these requirements to the armed forces.
Before Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (SDSR), we recognised that the Ministry of Defence was woefully underfunded for the programmes of all three services which were, in any case, operating in a strategic vacuum; Afghanistan was mesmerising everyone.
With a fresh government, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), the generation of a National Security Strategy (NSS), the reports commissioned by Dr Fox to improve, radically, Ministry of Defence (MOD) procedures and the imminent SDSR promised much in spite of the severe economic situation. There was
a chance that a clear set of intentions might emerge.
Admittedly, the timescale for SDSR production was extremely truncated but the inputs to it smacked of short term partisanship so, the review seemed to focus on immediate operations (things already well known that should have been planned for some years since) and, otherwise, took a panglossian view of the medium and short term. These errors became exposed very swiftly with our involvement in the Libyan conflict when the risks and rewards of providing the required air superiority, most cost effectively, were called into question.
Since SDSR, DS has written to every Member of Parliament, developed a website, and written or sponsored a number of papers which either support particular aspects of the SDSR or highlight the incoherences in it. We agree, for example, that to go ahead with the Trident replacement system is a statement that we stand “inter pares” with western democracies prepared to deter rogue states. We decry the confused thinking that has led to an ill advised decision that means the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force will not meet their proper operational requirements for
“state of the art” fast jet fighters.
We believe that Defence is the action arm of Foreign Policy (FP). The government is doing FP on the hoof according to prevailing circumstances. That's a plan not a strategy. We need a strategy that allows all departments of State to discern, easily, their own plans. We call this a Grand Strategy (GS). Because there isn't a GS we don't have joined up and properly scoped FP, which in turn means we don't have a well thought out Defence Policy (DefPol).
Without a meaningful DefPol, MOD doesn't know what military power is required or how to equip for national risks. Hence, the Services guess the best they can with Defence Equipment & Support not knowing what to buy and industry not being told, accurately, what to deliver.
We deduce from all that has been written and said by the government that the emphasis has got to lie within a “Maritime Strategy” rather than a “Continental Strategy” which, incidentally, the United Kingdom has never been very good at nor truly aspired to and does not chime with present declared intentions for defending the nation. In military terms this means moving away from what might generally be called “standing armies” to flexible, rapidly deployable troops well able to operate autonomously in many and, quite often, distant parts of the world. For this,
autonomous air cover and logistical support are vital. More generally, air defence of the UK, cyber warfare protection, policing and other emergency services need a strategy from which to derive their plans.
In a very real sense we have a metaphor for the incoherence that stems from a lack of Grand Strategy to steer almost all aspects of government policy and to establish clear directives for security and defence of the realm. This brings us on to the central feature of the meeting which is a lack of Grand Strategy that is demonstrated in the case of the RN and RAF by - “the reversal of the aircraft carrier fit from Catapults and Arrester Gear to Short Take Off and Vertical Landing?” This one change, seeming so trivial yet applauded in cost saving terms by almost everyone, undermines FP, severely reduces our ability to operate effectively with allies at the strategic level and leaves the nation vulnerable because we will be very limited in acting alone whilst retaining little leverage when reliant on others - most importantly
the United States of America and key allies in NATO and the European Union. The army too have been affected – note the current uncertainty over the future balance between the regulars, TA and combat support services (CSS).
You may have further questions for us arising from sight of this one page brief or may wish to ask us to explain our general position a little further or wish to discuss the issue of 'maritime strategy' in more detail. Please feel to contact DS at any time.
