Readiness, Responsiveness, Resilience, Regeneration and Capacity The Elephant in the Room for the United Kingdom Strategic Defence and Security Review
Summary
The 2015 United Kingdom (UK) Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR 2015) made some strides in addressing capability gaps created by, and identified following, SDSR 2010. The Vanguard Successor programme was agreed, the requirement for Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) was recognised, a commitment to buy up
to 138 F35 Lightning II over the lifetime of the build was made, reorganisation of Reaction Forces into mobile and well armed Strike Brigades with the new Ajax family of vehicles was announced, new Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) and logistic ships were to be ordered for the Royal Navy (RN) alongside a commitment to a national
shipbuilding strategy review led by Sir John Parker, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) was promised extra Typhoons to bolster UK air defence. Extra personnel in the hundreds were authorised for the RN and RAF but not in the thousands that had been trailed as necessary ahead of SDSR.
Even so, major limitations to the utility of British Forces emerged from SDSR 2015. First, the In Service Date (ISD) for new equipment moved to the right and Future Force Twenty Twenty (FF2020) morphed into FF2025, a decision that prolongs the time that risk is sustained (What has been referred to as the; Jam Tomorrow ' syndrome). The SDSR failed to fully address the fundamental disparity that has steadily grown between stated intention and actual capability which impacts the true utility of Her Majesty's Armed Forces. Finally, an irreducible limit has been reached, perhaps, according to more than one former service chief, passed, in respect of weapons platforms and personnel. What the SDSR fell short on was the critical doctrinal aspects which should underpin it - Readiness, Responsiveness,
Resilience, Regeneration and Capacity (R4C) – all largely ignored over the past 20 years with successive governments tending to honour their responsibility more in the breach than the observance.
This short paper is written to define the importance of R4C for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) war planners and the negative impact neglect of R4C has upon Her Majesty's Government (HMG) foreign policy aspirations. DS addresses each heading in turn and in the case of Responsiveness uses the summary of a RAND Corporation study into NATO reinforcement of the Baltic States as a case study - see Annex A for the detail.
Main Discussion
Readiness:
Force Readiness can be viewed as the time within which a unit or formation can be made ready to perform unit-type tasks. This time is amplified or measured by indicators of its current personnel, materiel and training state, albeit, according to Joint Warfare Publication JWP 0.01.1, the time in this instance does not include transit time into theatre.
Therefore, Force Readiness is dependent upon recovery post operation and there are many crucial factors to consider – not least that war fighting and peace time training engenders casualties and equipment loss through accidents, increased wear and tear and/or enemy action. Thus, SDSR 2015 should have considered issues associated with
Force Regeneration such as:
is the trained and specialised personnel strength of each service sufficient to provide a replacement Force at readiness within Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA) guidelines? A difficult one to comment upon because at the time of writing MOD has still not published the unclassified element of the 2015 DPA which it delegated to the
Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).
Which leaves unanswered questions: Can or should readiness time scales and the ability to deploy forces be sacrificed until troops are rested, trained and casualty replacements and equipment replacements found? Are equipment inventories and Order of Battle (ORBAT) sufficient to meet the DPA Readiness requirements? Will time have to be sacrificed in order to meet procurement lead times to replace, repair or modify weapons platforms ahead of deployment? Are sustainment stockpiles of expendable munitions and spares sufficient to meet the DPA requirement? Will time have to be sacrificed in order to fund, procure and rebuild operational stockpiles consumed on earlier or ongoing operations? Can/should UK's Allies be relied upon to make good personnel or equipment shortfalls as is happening with RN manning and RAF LRMPA operations? Finally, how (is) Readiness defined, trained for and tested to
meet HMG's stated defence expeditionary warfare policy objectives.
Responsiveness:
Responsiveness is linked to Readiness because for a force to be able to respond to a deployment order that force must also be ready ie up to strength, trained and equipped. Where response differs from being simply ready is in the
enabling capability over time. During the two Gulf wars the UK had the luxury of several months in which to make its plans, draw together, train and make ready the operational elements, and time to find the logistic enablers to move the force into theatre – along a permissive line of communications (LOC). However, according to the RAND Corporation study summary at Annex A, NATO would not have the luxury of several weeks let alone months to respond to a Russian armed incursion into the Baltic States. It has been estimated that without large NATO formations being in-place within hours the campaign will be lost. For UK, a major NATO partner with a leadership role in very high response forces (VJTF) part of the NATO Reaction Forces (NRF), the emphasis must be on rapid insertion of large numbers of well equipped troops with supporting heavy armour. However, FF2025 in a post SDSR 2015 era does not provide the UK with the capability to move more than a light brigade at short notice; the bulk of heavy armour, artillery, Ajax and/or Warrior Armoured Personnel Carriers being confined to road/rail and sea transit. It is by no means certain that UK's
contribution to the VJTF/NRF in a Baltic reinforcement scenario would be adequate or arrive in time to influence the outcome. Other NATO forces will have to be in-place ahead of the UK contribution or NATO must concede that sovereign territory will be lost.
Resilience:
Resilience of a force is a factor of morale coupled to practical sustainability. To quote from NATO publication AAP-6-2, Force Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration
required to achieve its objective – personnel, weapons platforms and sustainment stocks all forming part of the mix. Failure to achieve this balance, including the aintenance of morale, weakens UK's ability to provide effective Forces or to rapidly concentrate Force in response to threats. Underpinning UK force sustainment plans is a Just in Time philosophy that places huge confidence in the ability of the supply chain to react when required putting commercial suppliers directly into the UK Resilience loop.
The affect upon morale of trained troops that know or feel that the resources to support them in combat are not being made available should be obvious, but are they? Is the actual experience of personnel within the armed forces encouraging sufficient numbers of trained personnel to be retained and capability gaps avoided by encouraging personnel not to exercise their right to leave prematurely or to sign-on when time is served; the 2015 Continual Attitudes Survey indicates otherwise. Sadly, within the UK services confidence in Just in Time is so low it is often referred to, cynically, as Just too Late and personnel in pinch trades who have to deploy more frequently know all too well the stress that under-manning has on their home life.
Regeneration:
Force Regeneration to meet a general call-up in a NATIONAL EMERGENCY might require the full immediate participation of the Regular Forces, the Regular Reserves, and all volunteer reserve personnel. Would there be sufficient training places, trainers, barracks, unit weapons and personal kit to accommodate and equip such a short order increase in personnel? For example, what useful purpose would the 31,000 Regular Army Reserve in addition to the 30,000 Army Reserve serve if the hardware, combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS), weapons
platforms, enablers and suitable re-training were not available?
As a case study - pilot aircrew for Typhoon and F35B - it can take up to 5 years for a new pilot to enter service and become Combat Ready, several months for qualified, but non-current, pilots to re-qualify. Which makes the time-line for Regeneration of some forces impracticable unless the warning time for call-up allows for prolonged training and the release of qualified instructors and platforms from an already diminished cadre of combat ready personnel and assets. The paradox to be negotiated is that to fill the need for extra pilots to fly operationally, the pool of already trained pilots and combat ready aircraft will have to be depleted in order to train the new intake.
The requirement for regeneration of forces rightly concentrates upon the personnel element and this cannot be understated. A unit or formation can only re-deploy once rested, retrained, re-equipped and brought up to operational strength in line with Government agreed force Harmony guidelines. These factors were not fully considered
in SDSR 2015 and the calculated total trained establishment for each armed service has therefore been underplayed.
However, regeneration applies equally to major weapons platforms, especially the more complex systems that require hauling off the line for damage repair, in-service-life-maintenance and technology updates/refresh: ships, aircraft, armour, ICT and certain high-tech munitions. The capacity and time-scale to build/replace/repair current systems and equipment is problematic. For example, shipbuilding, complex land systems and aircraft delivery capacity in UK is insufficient to maintain present levels of capability let alone offer timely replacement for reasons of attrition. This is
often defined as; we fight with what we have on day one;. Indeed, in the case of some maritime and air elements, the ability to carry out maintenance and battle damage repairs may have been reduced further with the introduction of contractor maintenance contracts. It is highly unlikely that the majority of our complex systems (eg T45, Typhoon, Apache, F35B) could accept battle damage and continue to operate, or be battle damage repaired, without return to contractor facilities. For example: The RN has no reserve ships to replace casualties and has recently
decommissioned the only mobile repair ship RFA DILIGENCE.
Capacity: As the numbers of expensive complex weapons systems and platforms decrease, so availability is restricted too. Fewer platforms to meet the intensity of tasking inevitably equates to fewer front line assets being combat ready at the time they are most required, or simultaneously being in the multiplicity of places required. [One ship can only be in one place at one time] Fewer platforms mean that those available are often operating beyond operational and maintenance planning schedules, almost always in more hostile environments than peacetime planning allows for – in
essence we are working them into the ground – the Tornado Force is a prime example! This also applies to the more sophisticated munitions carried, which, when used beyond planned peacetime rates of effort, leads to a rapid and unsustainable decrease of weapon stockpiles. Indeed, in some previous armed conflicts the UK has
had difficulty in obtaining or resupplying ordnance or to readily access software supplied by allies. A problem amplified by a procurement policy that orders less
equipment from UK industry, using longer inflexible contracts, eroding the nation's industrial base and military sustainment economy.
Conclusion
Since SDSR 1998 there has been a consistent argument from the government that more can be done with less. Those with even basic military knowledge will understand that, in terms of readiness, regeneration and flexibility of response, this is a militarily dangerous assumption. To inspire confidence that the government is indeed serious in achieving a Force 2025 that matches their international and domestic aspirations, the underlying defence and security philosophy of fewer more technological complex systems is better than greater mass must be challenged. In this respect SDSR 2015 should have re-profiled Her Majesty's Forces to match the operational requirement HMG is willing to fund, but singularly failed to acknowledge this.
SDSR 2015 was a remedial step in the right direction but too much has still been left as a future aspiration or a largely unachievable goal through a lack of personnel, primary weapons platforms, sustainment stocks and enablers. Thus, the glaring gap in UK's capability is its inability to match commitments made to allies in a reasonable operationally coherent time frame. To this end the UK may be offering NATO capability it either does not have or cannot get to the fight in a timely fashion, even within Continental Europe.
This state of affairs is a direct result of HMG and MOD focusing too heavily upon total defence spend rather than what it is spent on. If the focus was upon Readiness, Responsiveness, Resilience, Regeneration and Capacity (R4C) the correct ORBAT would naturally emerge. It can be argued that successive UK Governments have allowed the complex issues in Defence to become so poorly scrutinised that requests for action are simply accepted by Armed Forces personnel (the can do approach) even knowing that they have to fight without the requisite enablers to do so.
An open Defence debate is required to establish the actual status of UK defence using R4C as the bench mark. To achieve this HMG must remove the gag from senior Armed Forces personnel so that they can be as accountable as any Chief Constable, Doctor or teacher.
DefenceSynergia 24 October 2016
Annex A: SUMMARY OF RAND CORPORATION FINDINGS - Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank - Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics by David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson
• Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga is 60 hours.
• Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad.
• Having a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities— might prevent such an
outcome.
• While not sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or to restore NATO members’ territorial integrity, such a posture would fundamentally change the strategic picture from Moscow.
• While this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive in absolute terms, it is not unaffordable, especially in comparison with the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies.
Rand Corp Key findings:
Russia’s recent aggression against Ukraine has disrupted nearly a generation of relative peace and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the perspective of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the threat to the three Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—former Soviet republics, now member states that border Russian territory—may be the most problematic.
In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states.
The games’ findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.
Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad:
A bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous
consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics.
Fortunately, avoiding such a swift and catastrophic failure does not appear to require a Herculean effort.
Further gaming indicates that a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy Armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities—could suffice to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states. While not sufficient to mount a sustained defense of the region or to achieve NATO’s ultimate end state of restoring its members’ territorial integrity, such a posture would fundamentally change the strategic picture as seen from Moscow.
Instead of being able to confront NATO with a stunning coup de main that cornered it as described above, an attack on the Baltics would instead trigger a prolonged and serious war between Russia and a materially far wealthier and more powerful coalition, a war Moscow must fear it would be likely to lose.
Crafting this deterrent posture would not be inexpensive in absolute terms, with Annual costs perhaps running on the order of $2.7 billion. That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product in excess of $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it hardly appears unaffordable, especially in comparison with the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—that is, of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.
