Empowering UK Defence Research

Empowering National Security

DefenceSynergia Input for Strategic Defence Review 2024

“We trained hard—but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we were
reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing, and
what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while actually producing

confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization.”

―Petronius Arbiter circa AD64

Introduction – The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) purpose as stated in the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) Terms of Reference is as follows: The SDR will determine the roles, capabilities and reforms
required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century,
deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory to 2.5%. The
Review will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and
prosperity, of the United Kingdom.

This brief is written by DefenceSynergia (DS) an independent Defence and Strategy research
group to inform the Strategic Defence Review.

DS has been involved with defence inputs since Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (SDSR
2010) and has contributed to SDSR 2015, the Integrated Review 2021 and Integrated Review Refresh
2023. DS members' experience includes: Former Defence Attaché (Argentina) and Air and Naval
Attaches (Spain and Russia), a Former Associate Fellow at RUSI, a Former head of Naval Medical
Services and Maritime, Land and Aviation expertise covering: Government contracting in respect of
procurement and leasing maritime and land assets; Major Project Management and operational
experience in AEW, radar, navigation, avionics, communications. Electronic warfare, IT, Tactical Data
Links, NEC, Programme Management; Risk Management, Cyber, Cipher, Home Land Security and
Resilience Planning; MOD Procurement, Provisioning and Logistic Planning for Expeditionary Warfare;
Nuclear Technology; Joint Operations Planning; Forces Clinical, Mental Health and Charity Sector et al.

DS considers that there has been a dearth of Strategic thinking and a deliberate attempt by No10, the
Cabinet Office, Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Civil Service (CS) to avoid articulating National and
Military Strategic aims. This has left the Chiefs of Staff and independent planners and analysts with the
problem, that without an articulated Strategy all plans are open to interpretation – plans are made to fit
Treasury funding not the threat as assessed by professionally trained people. The threat is
projected by HMG/MOD PR to be as great as the funding will allow! If DS understands the MOD Terms
of Reference correctly then this request to provide a comprehensive Defence Review has been foiled at
the first hurdle by this statement: “...deliverable and affordable within the resources available to
Defence within the trajectory to 2.5%.”

The deadline of mid 2025 for the Review Panel to report is considered by DS to be both excessive and
unnecessary. In addition to the work each of the professional Review panellists, Ministers and ex
Secretaries of State have conducted themselves over the past decade or more and the personal
experience each has had directly in the Strategy and Defence arenas there is a myriad of expert work
in the public domain already. Not least the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 undertaken since the
Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the daily Defence Intelligence briefings that have been produced
since the original Russian incursion into Crimea in 2014.

The Input – DS has argued for over 14 years that HMG must provide MOD with an articulated, and
preferably cross party agreed, National and Military Strategy from which cohesive and effective forces
can be calculated, resourced and funded to meet HMG diplomatic and security aims. Answering the
where, when, how long for, on how many fronts, with which allies questions will dictate the
Forces required to meet HMG's Diplomatic and National Security goals. Pre-loading the questions with funding parameters will simply restrict the Review authenticity. Instead of a true reflection of the output we will be given yet another bogus equation equalling the Threat that HM Treasury and No 10 are prepared to fund.

However, if the Review Panel is able to be flexible on this restriction then DS offers the following
observations in good faith:

What Should UK Strategy Look Like. It is the DS view, based upon past HMG, FCDO, and MOD
output, that the UK has three specific areas of international security and diplomatic focus and two which
are domestic:

1. NATO (North of the Tropic of Cancer).
2. East of Suez as far as Australasia.
3. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) obligations and responsibilities.
4. Armed Forces support for the Security Services and Police in the suppression of domestic
terrorism.
5. Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA)

The UK has many historic arrangements - FPDA, AUKUS, Five Eyes, Atlantic Charter, bi-lateral and
multi-lateral treaties and UNSC – which require knitting into a cohesive UK defence and security
options package to resolve the serious potential for overstretch and possible embarrassment and loss
of credibility that comes from offering allies more than the UK has funded or can ever provide.

A Matter of Logistics. DS has been critical at the lack of logistic enablers across HM Armed Forces.
The steady reduction in sustainment stocks, ammunition reloads, war reserves, support equipment and
trained combat ready personnel for Combat Support and Combat Service Support in the Army and RAF
must be reversed. In the RN these logistic tasks fall largely to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA).

The purpose of the RFA is to provide the RN (and NATO allies) with at sea logistic support during
combat operations as well as peacetime. The RFA - with ships taken-up from trade (STUFT) support -
provides, inter alia, bulk strategic lift for all the armed forces as well as platforms for primary casualty
evacuation and has provided disaster relief, humanitarian aid and constabulary duties. As with all
logistic enablers across defence the RFA is indispensable, yet like other logistic elements across the
Armed Forces, the RFA has been badly neglected.

UK Global Role. DS maintains that if HMG confirms a global role then HM Armed Forces must be structured and resourced to enable this aspiration. As a minimum, Defence funding must allow for niche capability on a regular basis and full Critical Mass on occasion possibly operating concurrently in two hemispheres. DS feels that this will require HM Forces to provide five levels of major operational and
combat capability:

1. Continual at Sea Deterrent (CASD) and attendant naval and air escorts.
2. British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF) Combat-air and Tactical air transport and Support Helicopters en-masse for NATO rapid reinforcement.
3. Royal Navy (RN), Royal Marine (RM), Carrier combat air group, surface and subsea escorts and Royal Fleet Auxiliary support and RAF Strategic Air Transport for East of Suez and supporting maritime/air defence of the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap (GIUK Gap).
4. UNSC mandated tasking (Peacekeeping/Peacemaking) including the Right to Protect (R2P)
and Protected and Assisted evacuations.
5. Armed Forces support for HM Home Office and Security Services via Special Forces
in pursuit of anti-terrorism actions and more broadly Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA).

DS argues that humanitarian relief and support is an FCDO/Cabinet Office responsibility not MOD.
Whilst Armed Forces resources can always be called upon by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary or
Home Secretary the budget must fall to those departments calling in aid the support. However, as with
MACA support - which is also unfunded on a day to day basis - the SDR 2024 team may wish to reflect
that HM Forces are already well below critical mass with too few people for the many tasks already
assigned or envisaged.

It has been reported that our principal ally the USA perceives that the UK Armed Forces have become

less lethal in their deterrent role. This must be addressed and become a core remedial action providing
a ‘success’ indicator for this SDR.

A closer and symbiotic working relationships between MOD and UK
Defence Industry may assist if development to production lead times of new lethal technology can be
made to meet or exceed current threat profiles.

Areas for SDR reflection: The Review Panel should question some of the line items and cost centres in the Defence Budget more widely.

1. Is there a case for the replacement nuclear deterrent to be provided from Central Funds?
2. Is the British peacetime Defence Budget the right cost area to support HMG policy in defence of a third country (Ukraine)?
3. How to inform the British public of the percentage of GDP spent on Defence in non lethal areas such as Pensions and extraneous non-contributory areas?
4. Is the decommissioning of British nuclear submarines a Defence expenditure or a national expenditure?
5. Little can be achieved militarily (except in penny packets) until the Critical Mass of HM Forces is addressed most especially logistic enablers in personnel, stocks and resources have been restored to pre SDSR 2010 levels.

Conclusions.

1. A Strategic Defence Review that has no articulated Strategy to base its research upon is open to challenge and change without explanation.
2. A Strategic Review that is confined to arbitrary financial constraints is unlikely to provide a cohesive reflection of the Armed Forces ORBAT and Critical Mass required to meet the many threats already identified or emerging.

Recommendations.

1. The PM and Secretary of State for Defence must provide the Review Panel with Strategic
Objectives for the UK, hopefully with cross party agreement.
2. The Review Panel is allowed to produce a report without the constraint of an arbitrary 2.5% of
GDP target.
3. Involve the veteran community to harness past experience.
4. Shorten the deadline – this report is needed now.

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