THE ROYAL FLEET AUXILIARY IN CRISIS

The Royal Fleet Auxiliary [RFA] celebrated its centenary in 2005. This short paper examines the situation that this vital logistics support organisation finds itself facing in 2024 as a result of government failures to recognise its importance over several decades.

To understand the importance of the RFA to the Royal Navy (RN) it is crucial to examine the reasons for the existence of this essential maritime service.

During the 19^th century, technical developments led to the replacement of sailing ships with steam engines using screw propulsion and the Admiralty had to establish a world-wide chain of coaling stations. To help achieve this the Admiralty employed non-commissioned, civilian manned ships as fleet auxiliaries which fell into two categories;

a)Vessels taken up by charter [the forerunner of today’s Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT)].

b)Vessels owned and operated by the Admiralty. 

There existed a clear division between commissioned warships, and non-commissioned ships, however, it was decided that there should be a clear differentiation between STUFT ships and those owned by the Admiralty. Therefore,  I an Admiralty circular letter dated 3^rd August 1905 it was stated that the style “Royal Fleet Auxiliary” would identify Admiralty owned ships from those on charter. Thus, was born the RFA.

To satisfy the then Merchant Shipping Act [1894], these RFA ships were registered under the name of the managing owner- the Secretary to the Board of the Admiralty. The Admiralty becoming the owners of what was essentially a shipping line.  And little changed until the latter part of the 20^th century.

Operation Corporate in 1982 was the catalyst for a significant change of status for the RFA. The advent of auxiliaries fitted with defensive weapons, extensive aviation facilities and embarked naval parties generated official concern about the role of the RFA in support of the UK’s armed forces. This led in April 1985 to HMG suggesting that it intended to de-register all RFA vessels, and as such, the Merchant Shipping Acts would no longer apply. However, HMG also stated that this would not affect the terms and conditions of British merchant seafarers who manned the RFA.

However, after consideration this change and de-registration did not happen.   Rather a change of status was initiated, with regulatory responsibilities moving from the Department of Transport to the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

In 1989 this change was formalised in the Merchant Shipping [Ministry of Defence] Order-in-Council 1989.  A “letter of understanding ”between MoD [Navy] and the Department of Transport stated that the RFA would continue to comply with 'most' of the relevant Merchant Shipping Acts to 1988 and remain British registered merchant ships.

As it remains to this day! Thus making a nonsense of statements by ministers, MPs and Unions, that the new Fleet Solid Support Ships(FSS) to be built for the RFA are “warships”. They are not, as has been the case since 1905 to date.

CURRENT SITUATION

Discontent with pay and conditions has been building over a period of circa 15 years, with personnel feeling over worked, under valued and with paywell out of alignment with that of the commercial world. Informed sources suggest RFA pay has lost between 25 and 30% of its value over the last 10 to 15 years. The total workforce now stands at around 1,700 people which is not enough to crew the current fleet - it is estimated that the three new FSS ships will require crews of circa100, so it is not difficult to see where this situation is leading.

The wage bill for the RFA [2022/23] stands at £92m and to bring it back to its value in 2010, an increase of around 30% would be required.RFA Masters’ salaries range from £83,541.00 to £95,442.00 per annum. By comparison, Masters and Chief Engineers in the US Military Sealift Command can earn up to $226,300.00 [£175,188.60] per annum.  It is not being suggested that RFA salaries should mirror those of their American counterparts, but it illustrates how far behind RFA pay has fallen.

Seafarers with British certificates of competence are much in demand and research suggests qualified UK masters, can command salaries of between £112,000 and £150,000. It is, therefore, arguable that a complete overhaul of RFA terms and conditions is needed now. Which is not a new phenomenon. In 1947/48, pay and conditions lagged behind commercial companies, resulting in a three-figure total of mid-level officers [2^ndmates and 3^rdengineers in particular] leaving the RFA. The Admiralty, as a responsible ship owner recognised this, and the Director of Stores was quick to recognise and rectify the matter. Perhaps the MoD of today might recognise some of the benefits that accrued from the Admiralty being a ship owner.

CURRENTFLEET

6 TWIN HULLED FLEET TANKERS 

Comprising 4 TIDE class [2017-2019]

2 WAVE class [2002]

1 AOR [Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment]

FortClass [doubles as the only Ammunition, Food, Explosives and Stores(AFES) in the fleet] [1992]

3 LANDING SHIP DOCK [AUXILIARY]

3 BAY class [2006-2007]

1 PRIMARY CASUALTY RECEIVING SHIP/AIR TRAINING SHIP

RFA ARGUS [1981]

1 OCEAN SURVEILLANCE VESSEL

RFA PROTEUS [2019]

1 AUTONOMOUS MINE WARFARE SUPPORT VESSEL

RFA STIRLINGCASTLE [2011]

OPERATIONAL STATUS

Of the seven replenishment at sea {RAS] ships in the fleet [the six tankers and the AOR], only two tankers of the Tide class are available. One other [RFA Tideforce] is in refit and the other three, including the five-year-old Tiderace, are laid up at extended readiness. The only solid support vessel, essential for carrier operations, RFA Fort Victoria is laid up with a small maintenance crew. She is supposed to accompany the Carrier Strike Group (CSG)deployment next year, but informed sources suggest she is unlikely to go to sea again because of the inability to crew her, and a defect rectification refit has yet to commence. As an example of the effect of the above, Flag Officer Sea Training [FOST] has had to make an arrangement with the Germans to supply the FOST tanker, as the RFA cannot guarantee to supply a ship for this vital task. 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, here is a reminder of the Falklands conflict of 1982[Operation Corporate]. Recently a senior officer was asked if the UK could put together a Task Force if required to repossess the Islands.He replied “of course”.

In 1982 the RFA fleet numbered 27 vessels, of which 22 were committed to the Task Force. These included 10 replenishment tankers, 4 AFES[Ammunition, Food, Explosives and Stores] and one Solid Stores ship.In support were 15 commercial tankers and 12 container ships and freighters [STUFT]. In addition, the liners Queen Elizabeth 2 and Canberra were utilised as fast troop carriers, and among the specialised commercial ships were two specialised off-shore vessels.One of these repaired, at sea, over fifty battle and weather damaged ships. I leave it to readers to decide whether they believe that the assets to form a task group actually exist, or whether it is simply hubris.

DAVID C GRAHAM.

22 JULY 2024

DefenceSynergia (DS) is indebted to Professor Dr Julian Lindley-French, Chairman, The Alphen
Group (TAG), for allowing DS to publish his excellent essay written on this 75th

anniversary of the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
The essay reproduced verbatim below is prescient and informative. Given that a former British
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Labour Government in which he served post-WW2 was
instrumental in the formation of NATO the parallels with 2024 are both eerie and stark - Europe
stands on the precipice of war, the European and British Armed Forces are well below 'critical
mass' and future support of the USA is uncertain.

Dr Lindley-French's essay is spot on – please read on:

NATO 75 Essay: The Sad, the Mad and the Quite Possibly Bad

“...the Americans have not yet reached the stage where they regard themselves as equal
partners in the enterprise [NATO]...They still feel that they are in the position of a kind of fairy
godmother handing out favours for less fortunate Western European countries – provided
always that the latter can justify their claims to such favours...it is up to the European countries
to make the running and to provide the administration with the necessary ammunition to enable
it to deal with Congress”.
Top Secret Memo from British Ambassador to Washington Sir Oliver Franks to British Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin, August 1948. 

Ernie’s Vision

July 10th, 2024. Much of the ‘noise’ at the NATO 75 summit in Washington will be rightly about
Ukraine at which the Allies will again commit to keeping Kyiv the fight, but baulk at giving the
Ukrainians anything like enough weapons to kick Putin out. The real issue will be precisely the
three issues that will not be addressed – the patent lack of strategic direction, the lack of
leadership and Europe’s sad inability to deliver its own defence requirements.
There are many who can claim to be the real founder on NATO but one who has a real claim is
Britain’s Foreign Secretary at the time of the April 1949 Treaty of Washington, Ernest ‘Ernie’
Bevin. He was ably assisted by the then British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Oliver Franks.
Having forged the 1948 Brussels Pact of European countries in mid July 1948. Bevin came away
from a meeting in The Hague firm in his belief that unless the US committed itself formally to
the defence of Western Europe Europeans would be easy prey to the 350 Red Army divisions
stationed close to the inner-German border. Bevin’s assessment was as much political as
strategic. Germany was still as much the enemy as the Soviets, France had no government,
Britain was broke, President Harry S. Truman was facing re-election and the rest of Western
Europe did not matter militarily. Today? France has no government, Britain is broke, Germany
only plays at defence, still uses World War Two to avoid responsibility, and just announced a real
terms cut to its defence budget. The only other European power of defence note is Poland,
forever brave enough but never big or rich enough to offset the weakness of its big neighbour.
Worse, the Americans face an electoral choice in November between an increasingly cognitively
impaired President Biden who is simply no longer up to leading the free world, and Donald J.
Trump who does not want to lead the free world.

Plus ca change?

Bevin knew that only a Herculean effort on the part of the British and other war-devastated
Europeans could really convince the Americans to recommit to Europe at a time when much of
America simply wanted to ‘bring the boys home’. Bevin vision was for the Americans to
guarantee European security through a North Atlantic Pact, in return for Europeans committing
to ‘self-help’. To that end, London committed to retain British forces in strength in Germany
indefinitely at great cost. This was something which the strategically illiterate Cameron
government did not understand when they withdrew HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps from
Rheindahlen in December 2013. HQARRC was the last vestige of the once mighty British Army
of the Rhine. Moscow has and always will see power in military terms and the withdrawal of HQ
ARRC was yet another symbol Putin understood only too well at a time when much of NATO was

also mired in Afghanistan. At the time, I was associated with HQARRC and made my concerns
clear to London about the dangerous political symbolism of closing down Rheindahlen. London
did not listen. It never does. In February 2014, Russia seized Crimea.
If the Allies really believe in NATO they will once again have to make a Herculean effort to
convince over-stretched, over-spent, over-wrought America to continue to guarantee Europe’s
security. THAT is the REAL issue at this Summit in a political vacuum and what awaits the new
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte He will need to use all his powers of persuasion because as
Dutch prime minister he gutted the Dutch armed forces. The only way the Americans can

guarantee the future of Europe’s defence is if the Europeans bear the increasing burden of self-
help. That will mean many of Western Europe’s political leaders breaking habits of a political

lifetime and end the sad mealy-mouthed nonsense about the unaffordability of sound defence
due to cost of their bloated welfare states. Bevin, a Labour politician, would be appalled.

NATO 80?

What will Hercules demand of NATO’s European pillar not to mention the Canadians? The Alphen

Group has just published a new Transatlantic Compact https://thealphengroup.com/2024/07/09/to-
their-excellencies-the-permanent-representatives-on-the-north-atlantic-council/ which was superbly led

by two American colleagues and NATO experts, Diego Ruiz Palmer and Stanley Sloan. At its core
is an assessment of the forces and resources Europeans will need to provide as the minimum
political and force requirement. The Compact acknowledges the new Allied Reaction Force (ARF)
is an important milestone on the road to the vital NATO Force Model, but only if it is far more
than simply re-badging the now defunct NATO Response Force. It also acknowledges the superb
work done by SACEUR and his team to create the ‘Family of Plans’ which provide the bedrock
for a future Allied minimum force requirement. The ARF is a high readiness, highly mobile and
responsive mainly European force capable of deploying rapidly throughout SACEUR’s Area of
Responsibility to reinforce forward defences, prevent a fait accompli by an adversary, and
demonstrate unity.
So far, so good. By 2030, the New Force Model envisages the NATO Response Force of some
40,000 troops being transformed into a future force of some 300,000 troops maintained at high
alert, with 44,000 kept at high readiness. Whilst the new force will be held at 24 hours ‘Notice
to Act’ the bulk of the NATO Force Structure will be held at 15 days ‘Notice to Move’. Given that
both air and naval forces will also need to be included a land force of, say, 200,000 would need
at least 50 to 60 European rapid reaction brigades together with all their supporting elements.

There are only 20 at best 30 today.

The Compact is clear: by 2030 European Allies will need to provide collectively two thirds or
more of NATO’s overall required operational capacity as measured in the rapidly usable
forces, enablers and other capabilities needed. Moreover, no Ally must be expected to contribute
more than 50% of any individual NATO capability area, as pursued through the NATO Defence
Planning Process, with non-US Allies providing 67% or more of any given capability area,
recognizing that progress will be easier and faster in some areas than in others.

Deterring is doing!

What NATO plans mean in practice are that NATO Europe plus Canada must by 2030, no later

than 2035, deploy a combined MINIMUM operational land capacity of four fully-capable, fully-
enabled, fully-ready War-fighting Corps (WFC), together with all the required combat, combat

support and combat service support units. Three fully-capable, fully-enabled, fully-ready
Composite Air Strike Forces (CASF) with the full complement of defensive and offensive aircraft.
Two fully capable, fully-enabled, fully-ready Non-US Standing Fleets in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean with sufficient operational capacity to be augmented at short notice.
By return, and given US commitments world-wide, Washington would need to permanently
station in Europe a fully-capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready WFC (US Army’s V Corps); a

fully-capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready CASF (US Air Force’s 3rd Air Force); and a fully-
capable, fully-enabled and fully-ready US Navy 6th Fleet and its NATO component

(STRIKFORNATO) for Allied multi-carrier operations, and complemented by US Marine Corps and
Special Operations Forces. This force would with five fully capable war fighting corps, four CASF
air packages and three fleets.

European allies and Canada will also need to take further steps in every other domain of NATO
European military capacity including strengthened missile defences, nuclear policy and practice
and in both the space and cyber domains, as well as supporting civil measures to reinforce
resilience.

Pillar Talk

At a meeting of the GEN 75 committee (aka the atomic bomb committee) in October 1945 Ernie
Bevin famously said “We have to got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it (the bomb)”.
Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Churchill’s wartime deputy, and Bevin understood the need for
British power, not just to deter the Soviets, but also to influence the Americans. Bevin wanted
not only to demonstrate to Stalin that Britain still mattered but to the Americans that Britain
could also add value to American security and defence. It is precisely that which NATO Europe
must again demonstrate to Washington.
In December 1948, Bevin rose in the House to make an impassioned plea for what he called the
North Atlantic Pact. “...I wish to submit to the House a further consideration in this matter,
which is vital. All these instruments which unfortunately have to be provided to defend
ourselves today are tremendously costly. To try to maintain an adequate Navy, Air Force and
Army is almost too big a burden for any one country to carry by itself, that is if it is to stand by
itself. Once we can, in the West, get this basis of collective security with the United States and
Canada and the Western Powers, and others if they will come in, it should be possible to work
out a rationalised system of defence so that while we assure our collective defence we shall not
be draining off too much manpower from our economic resources and the development of our
economic requirements”.
THAT was the real reason for NATO 1949. It is also the real reason for NATO 2024 given the
need to deter Russian aggression and Chinese expansionism.
Peace through strength.

Julian Lindley-French
https://thealphengroup.com

DefenceSynergia- A Spring Budget Response

DefenceSynergia(DS) were increasingly dismayed as Mr Hunt, our Chancellor of the Exchequer, delivered his Spring 2024 (pre-election) Budget speech with NO intention to rescue the ability of the UK to protect itself and NATO. DS knew as all principled observers knew ahead of the speech, that HM Government options were limited by economic indicators that were not very favourable.

It was trailed by the Treasury that OBR calculations and forecasts indicated that if HMG were to meet their own 'Fiscal Rules' there was circa £9bn available for the Chancellor to spend without raising revenue. In normal circumstances, with an election only a few months away, it would be understandable that a political party faced with such a fiscal restriction would want to use the money to encourage voters to support them in the ballot to come. However, these are not normal times!

As political and Military leaders in the USA, UK and Europe have been saying for some time now 'the post-war era is over, we have already entered a new pre-war era'!MostNATOallies are already upping their Defence and Security spending, talking about conscription and increasing weapon and ammunition stockpiles and production facilities. But not the British Government and certainly not the British Chancellor of the Exchequer!

In a reasonably long speech, the Chancellor dealt with HM Armed Forces in a few words: “Our armed forces remain the most professional and best-funded in Europe defence spending already more than 2 per cent of GDP. We are providing more military support to Ukraine than nearly any other country and our spending will rise to 2.5 per cent as soon as economic conditions allow.”

The chancellor who knows defence knows that money spent does not equate to deterrent capability since the majority of the defence budget is expended in support functions.

With only a few voices in Parliament offering undivided support for UK to drastically increase Defence spending to face the potential coming onslaught, the Chancellor chose to lower National Insurance!

Only time will tell if this slice of Political largesse provides returns at the polling stations later in the year. Or if the neglect of ‘a stitch in time’ results in greater sorrow for our nation later!

However, if Putin persuades his Russian Federation cronies to sanction akinetic war with NATO the Chancellor will rue the lack of funding, not just for HM Forces but also the protectors - Police and emergency services - who will be required in far larger numbers to fill the glaring gap in Civil Defence and Home Defence that successive governments and the full panoply of opposition have failed to provide over decades.

.

SERVICES MANNING CRISIS: EFFECT UPON THE ROYAL NAVY

Type 23 frigates, HMS Northumberland, Richmond, and Montrose outboard of each other.

Summary

There is a crisis affecting all three of the United Kingdom’s armed services. It has been years in the making exacerbated by a decision in the 1990’s by the RN to freeze recruitment. With no sideways entry the consequence was that there was a shortage in each rank for the next 20 years exacerbated by the ill-thought-out 2010 Strategic Defence Review.

For the Royal Navy, the chickens are coming home to roost with a vengeance, leading to the announcement of the disposal of two Type 23 frigates, the laying up of both LPDs and a submarine service, itself short of many essential skills, which cannot find a Head of Service from within its ranks. Similarly, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary [RFA] has ships idle due to a lack of personnel and which has had to advertise for its professional head [Commodore RFA] because no one from within the service seems interested in the appointment.

The Problem

Problems involving both recruitment and retention revolve round the attractiveness of the "package" – Terms of Service - an understanding of career paths and advancement, certainty for the future [i.e. can I be made redundant if defence policy changes yet again], pay and conditions. For example the disgraceful state of the defence housing estate! Today’s junior rates will become the skilled and experience senior NCOs of the future, these people being the backbone of all three services, and without whom the Navy cannot function.

However, HMG seem to be stuck in the groove of treating servicemen like general government employees without taking into consideration the special nature of the tasks the armed forces are required to carry out. The same can be said of the RFA personnel. At present both officers and ratings of the RFA are being balloted by their respective unions on taking strike action because of the lack of progress on salaries and conditions. Whilst it may be convenient for government to regard them as civil servants, they are in fact British merchant seafarers, and as such deserve far better
than a “take it or leave it” offer. As a consequence many are voting with their feet along with many Royal Navy colleagues and leaving at the earliest opportunity.

It is therefore suggested that without a proper review of terms and conditions for serving personnel, Defence of the Realm, supposedly the first concern of  government, may simply collapse. Perhaps Ministers might take urgent notice of this, bearing in mind the current state of play worldwide in 2024.

The Current Naval Situation

It is time to examine the current situation regarding RN/RFA manning and its effect on surface ships and submarines.
It has been widely reported that two Type 23 Frigates - HMS Westminster and HMS Argyll - are due to be taken out of service. MOD PR is calling this an example of taking older ships out of service to release crew for new “high tech” ships, and the Type 26 frigates have been mentioned in this context. In this regard it should be noted that the Type 23 ship’s complement is 185.

HMS Glasgow is in the water and is being fitted out by BAE Systems at Scotstoun [expected sea trials circa 2027] whilst HMS Cardiff is on the hard standing at BAE Systems Govan with no floatation out date announced.

Frankly to suggest that ship’s complements are about to embark in either is fanciful even if as stated that Type 26 complement will be 157. Further more, no mention of the Type 31 frigates under construction at Rosyth has been made, the first of which, HMS Venturer, is expected to be launched later this year and will require a complement of circa 80-100.

T23/T31 Frigate Fleet.

There are 11 T23 Frigates: 5 General Purpose (GP) - Argyll, St Albans, Sutherland, Iron Duke and HMS Lancaster. 6 Anti Submarine (ASW) towed array ships - HMS Northumberland, HMS Kent, HMS Richmond, HMS Portland, HMS Somerset HMS Westminster.

HMS Westminster's OSD was slated for 2028 and her life extension refit [LIFEX] was completed in 2017 with a post LIFEX refit scheduled for the summer of 2023. However, a subsequent survey of Westminster suggested that her material condition was such that it was uneconomic to proceed.

Some refits of the class have cost circa £100m and taken 3-4 years to complete. Consideration must therefore be given to the condition of her sister HMS Northumberland, similarly hard run, whose LIFEX was 2026-2028. HMS Argyll is the oldest Type 23, completed in 1991 as a general purpose (GP) as opposed to a towed array (ASW) frigate. She is the first Type 23 to have a post LIFEX refit, which started in 2022, and must be near completion. This will have cost many millions of pounds, and when she is disposed of, will leave only two GP Type 23s, HMS Iron Duke, recently completed LIFEX, and HMS Lancaster (OSD 2024), is forward deployed to the Gulf. HMS Somerset has recently completed LIFEX and is the first ship in the fleet to fit the new Norwegian origin NSM in lieu of the "obsolete" Harpoon. This missile will be progressively fitted to Type 23 frigates and Type 45 destroyers. The first two Type 31 frigates are assumed to be years away from active service, so the decision to remove the newly refitted Argyll is bizarre.

T45 Destroyer Fleet.

There are 6 T45 Destroyers: HMS Daring, HMS Dragon, HMS Defender, HMS Diamond, HMS Dauntless, HMS Duncan.

Three Type 45 ships are in refit. HMS Daring and HMS Dragon are completing her re-engining under the Power Improvement Project [PIP] at Portsmouth. HMS Defender is in the first year of a 3 to 4 year refit programme [PIP and weapons enhancement]. Of the active T45s HMS Diamond is at sea [Red Sea/Gulf of Aden].  HMS Dauntless and HMS Duncan are in maintenance at Portsmouth. The Type 45 has a complement of 190; so perhaps it is fortunate three are currently inactive.  This despite MOD stating some years back that the aim was to have five destroyers
active a target that seems unlikely to be achieved currently.

Landing Platform Dock (LPD) Fleet.

There are 2 LPD: HMS Albion, HMS Bulwark.

Landing Platform Dock [LPD]. HMS Albion was reduced to stand by status in the  summer of 2023 to be replaced by HMS Bulwark. However, the latter’s restorative refit is still to complete and this will have cost millions of pounds and will have to be finished before she is laid up. This speaks of desperation; it certainly is not a strategic decision. LPDs have a ship’s complement of 352 and the Secretary of State for Defence has states that “by doing so [laying up] it will release 200 personnel” for manning other ships. If this implies manning a Type 26, the statement is nonsense in terms of both numbers and skill sets.

As HMS Argyll is to be disposed of, the only other frigates needing crews might be HMS St Albans [just completing a 4-year LIFEX], or HMS Sutherland [currently in LIFEX]. Interestingly, a senior officer, commenting on the LPD situation is reported as saying “they can be put in the cupboard and dusted off when needed.” It is difficult to comment on the absurdity of such a remark. A final comment on this is that it must throw the future of the Royal Marines mode of operations and indeed the future of the corps itself in doubt.

Submarine service.

SSNs

There are 7 Astute Class SSN in service or planned: In service HMS Astute, HMS Ambush, HMS Artful, HMS Audacious, HMS Anson. In build HMS Agamemnon, HMS Agincourt.  There is a single T Boat SSN still in-service: HMS Triumph.

It has been apparent for years that the submarine service is having difficulty in manning boats. There has, apparently, been shortages of engineers and technical Rates in a number of specialisations.  Presently in service there are six SSNs - 5 Astute class and 1 Trafalgar class [HMS Triumph]. Of the Astute class boats, one is still on trials after commissioning [HMS Anson] and one has been inactive for eleven months [HMS Audacious] as she awaits availability of a dry dock at Devonport!

SSBNs.

There are 4 SSBN in service: HMS Vanguard, HMS Victorious, HMS Vigilant, HMS Vengeance – to be replaced in due course by 4 Dreadnought Class SSBN.

HMS Vanguard is presently in America conducting her Demonstration and Shake-down Operation [DASO] on completion of her seven-year refit. This operation culminates with a test firing of a Trident missile, an event which will take place shortly. HMS Victorious is in Devonport commencing her five-year delayed refit, whilst the remaining 2 boats conduct CASD patrols.

As there have been two CASD patrols of over six months in recent times, it is perhaps unsurprising that the silent service is having retention difficulties. Two DS Colleagues are former submariners and suggest the fact that the service is having to advertise for a new 2-star head of service illustrates that there may be something seriously wrong in the organisation.

DS would further posit that perhaps, like the similar position in the RFA, the appointment is seen as a poisoned chalice or that the early retirement age of 55 from the Armed Forces has driven out people who would be qualified and otherwise have time in their naval careers.

The situation described shows that these decisions are not Strategy driven, rather by panic reaction to factors that should have been known for years. They certainly were to DS who have written on them and briefed the HCDC many times.

If people are not paid properly or feel insecure in their terms of service they also feel undervalued, their morale declines, and they vote with their feet. Governments need to address these matters urgently, and move away from the “this is what all public sector employees are getting, etc, etc” to a realisation that the armed forces are not in any shape or form ordinary public sector employees. If this is not recognised the armed services will collapse, as they cannot exist without people.

The same applies to the RFA. We now have the ridiculous situation where Serco are advertising for crew for an unidentified RFA. Does this mean Serco are going to run the ship? If so, where will this end up?

Conclusion

In conclusion, the UK is staring into the abyss. Despite the Foreign Secretary’s recent brave words, the UK has not sent “ships” to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The RN has deployed “a Ship,” HMS Diamond, the only running Type 45.

We are a trading nation [significant amounts of LNG and oil pass through the Gulf  and into the Red Sea en route to the Suez Canal] and it is shaming that we seem to be leaving the heavy lifting to the USN. Is it impossible to send a carrier or even an SSN to bolster the naval effort, or does the present administration simply not care?

DefenceSynergia argues that this analysis by one of our naval colleagues is correct and that remedial action must be taken by HMG/MOD to secure the defence of the realm?

Finally, DS would ask whether the UK Armed Forces are less capable of fighting because they have remained within their allocated budgets despite the percentage of GDP being above most of our NATO allies? Either way, UK Armed Forces seem to be in a situation reminiscent of the 1930s lead up to WW2 - UNREADY.

DefenceSynergia
07 January 2024.

DefenceSynergia Open Input to the HCDC Inquiry into UK Air Capability - 9^thJanuary 2024

DS is aware of the HCDC inquiry into Future Aviation Capabilities. A worthy topic no doubt but DS wonders if the issue of critical mass alongside full spectrum capability will ever be addressed?

We are mystified as to what CGS and CAS talk about given that ASTOR has been scrapped without a murmur; that the RAF no longer has an anti-radiation missile capability; that SEAD is just a topic for Staff College apparently; and that AEW/ISTAR coverage is in the hands of 3 Rivet Joint and 3 E-7 Wedgetail (if and when the latter arrive)? Or, that the RAF tactical AT fleet is now predicated upon 22 x A400m and Strategic airlift on 6 x C-17 and 14 Voyager A330 when they are not tasked on AAR duties elsewhere?

DS is also mystified as to what the First Sea Lord and CAS talk about given that the RAF can offer limited AAR for CSG except along the littoral axis and limited LRMPA to cover SSBN CASD operations; coverage of the Greenland, Iceland, UK Gap; surveillance of the Western and Eastern Mediterranean; and, presumably, further East should the CSG deploy there in support of stated HMG Foreign Policy towards AUKUS or FPDA?

All of that is before any rationalisation of the CSG Air Group versus the alleged land based use of UK's 48 x F35B has been properly assessed. E.G. Should UK buy a mix of F35A and F35B? And if a CATOBAR system is retrofitted should UK buy an E-2 derivative for carrier-based long-range AEW cover?

As the RAF consolidates into fewer centralised air bases it would be helpful to know what the AD/Ground Defence plans are given that our enemies not only know exactly where these bases are but will have to use less of their missile technology – subsonic, supersonic and hypersonic - to target them from range?

As lack of manpower is the current topic de jour what is CAS doing to increase technical and logistic resources, recruiting, training, and retention?

And this just scrapes the surface before the HCDC begins the worthy process of examining GCAP.