DefenceSynergia On Carrier Strike and the Absence of CATOBAR or SRVL
DefenceSynergia (DS) notes that it is now reported that to save less than £400,000 MOD (Navy) have delayed (or is that cancelled) shipborne rolling landing (SRVL) putting in jeopardy £millions in potential ditched fuel and stores at a time when HM Forces are recognised as being underfunded and unable to restore weapons stocks to war fighting levels, a position DS recognised as a considerable (apparently unmitigated) risk 15 years ago. DS does not have insight to the SD 98 but recently retired former senior officers have said openly that UK's ability to fight beyond a few weeks at maximum rates of effort are slim. Surely, therefore, urgent and decisive action is required at the most senior level if we are to ensure fully capable Carrier Strike and not merely large ships with a few limited aircraft, and hope that you will bring your weight to bear without delay.
DS has been analysing and commenting on the UK carrier project since the SDSR 2010 and has followed the UK carrier project since then and been active in our criticism of its obvious shortcomings. We continue to be surprised at the lack of progress with making carriers fully capable strike systems.
Indeed, in 2010 DS produced a comprehensive brief for MPs in Westminster which we provided to Dr Julian Lewis MP, Mr Bernard Jenkin MP, Miss Penny Mordaunt MP, Mrs Caroline Dinenage MP and several others who attended a meeting with DS at Westminster.
In brief we said:
1. True Carrier Strike must be able to project air power from the sea whilst allowing sea-room to counter enemy Anti-Access Area Denial (AA/AD) systems.
2. To fully achieve this a UK CSG would need to emulate USN and French Navy systems:
a) CATOBAR to provide maximum CSG flexibility to launch and recover heavy fully armed jets; to provide optimum AEW cover; to provide AAR both to extend strike and air defence range and endurance; to provide on-board supply support.
b) Appropriate surface and sub-surface escorts.
c) Appropriate carrier self defence systems.
3. However, the choice of CATOBAR system itself did not need to emulate USN (EMALS) or French Navy (Steam) systems but could be provided via a much less expensive system known as the Internal Combustion Catapult Launch System (ICCALS). Now named 'Firecat'.
4. DS recommended that MOD (Navy) should purchase the F18 at least as an interim buy until the F35C model had been fully tested and entered productive service.
5. DS pointed out in 2010 that if the UK CSG operated without an aircraft arrester system then the only aircraft available to operate off QEC Carriers would be the relative performance limited F35B and Helicopters.
6. DS pointed out that the performance limits of F35B would restrict sea-room and time on task without AAR support. The CSG AEW would also be restricted by reliance upon the helicopter borne Crowsnest system (ISD 2025 - OSD 2029 to be replaced in the 2030s by a UAV system we understand.) The US and French still use the E2 CATOBAR capable AEW system. We continue to be surprised that RN AEW&C is being treated as a minor add-on to the Air Group, which is at odds with how carrier operations were re-defined by the USN after WW2 with Project Cadillac; lessons and capabilities every bit as relevant today, and deficient, at high fleet cost, during the Falklands conflict.
7. DS also pointed out in 2010 that if the F35B were selected for CSG then without a proven shipborne rolling landing system (SRVL) the Weight, Altitude and Temperature (WAT) limits of the F35B could inevitably lead to the ditching of stores and/or fuel to assure a safe vertical landing option when the aircraft returned heavy – ie with unused internal/external stores.
All of this was and still is foreseeable.
